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WEAK LINK IN THE CHAIN

Time to check if you ran any of these 33 malicious Chrome extensions

Two separate campaigns have been stealing credentials and browsing history for months.

Dan Goodin | 143
Close-up of Google Chrome Web Browser web page on the web browser. Chrome is widely used web browser developed by Google.
Credit: Getty Images
Credit: Getty Images

As many of us celebrated the year-end holidays, a small group of researchers worked overtime tracking a startling discovery: At least 33 browser extensions hosted in Google’s Chrome Web Store, some for as long as 18 months, were surreptitiously siphoning sensitive data from roughly 2.6 million devices.

The compromises came to light with the discovery by data loss prevention service Cyberhaven that a Chrome extension used by 400,000 of its customers had been updated with code that stole their sensitive data.

’Twas the night before Christmas

The malicious extension, available as version 24.10.4, was available for 31 hours, from December 25 at 1:32 AM UTC to Dec 26 at 2:50 AM UTC. Chrome browsers actively running Cyberhaven during that window would automatically download and install the malicious code. Cyberhaven responded by issuing version 24.10.5, and 24.10.6 a few days later.

The Cyberhaven extension is designed to prevent users from inadvertently entering sensitive data into emails or websites they visit. Analyses of version 24.10.4 showed that it was configured to work with different payloads that were downloaded from cyberhavenext[.]pro, a malicious site the threat actor registered to give the appearance it was affiliated with the company. One recovered payload, Cyberhaven said, scoured user devices for browser cookies and authentication credentials for the facebook.com domain. A separate payload recovered by security firm Secure Annex stole cookies and credentials for chatgpt.com; Cyberhaven said the payload didn't appear functional.

The malicious version came through a spear phishing email sent to the developers Google listed for the Cyberhaven extension on Christmas Eve. It warned that the extension wasn’t in compliance with Google terms and would be revoked unless the developer took immediate action.

Screenshot showing the phishing email sent to Cyberhaven extension developers. Credit: Amit Assaraf

A link in the email led to a Google consent screen requesting access permission for an OAuth application named Privacy Policy Extension. A Cyberhaven developer granted the permission and, in the process, unknowingly gave the attacker the ability to upload new versions of Cyberhaven’s Chrome extension to the Chrome Web Store. The attacker then used the permission to push out the malicious version 24.10.4.

Screenshot showing the Google permission request. Credit: Amit Assaraf

As word of the attack spread in the early hours of December 25, developers and researchers discovered that other extensions were targeted, in many cases successfully, by the same spear phishing campaign. John Tuckner, founder of Secure Annex, a browser extension analysis and management firm, said that as of Thursday afternoon, he knew of 19 other Chrome extensions that were similarly compromised. In every case, the attacker used spear phishing to push a new malicious version and custom, look-alike domains to issue payloads and receive authentication credentials. Collectively, the 20 extensions had 1.46 million downloads.

“For many I talk to, managing browser extensions can be a lower priority item in their security program,” Tuckner wrote in an email. “Folks know they can present a threat, but rarely are teams taking action on them. We've often seen in security [that] one or two incidents can cause a reevaluation of an organization's security posture. Incidents like this often result in teams scrambling to find a way to gain visibility and understanding of impact to their organizations.”

The earliest compromise occurred in May 2024. Tuckner provided the following spreadsheet:

Name ID Version Patch Available Users Start End
VPNCity nnpnnpemnckcfdebeekibpiijlicmpom 2.0.1 FALSE 10,000 12/12/24 12/31/24
Parrot Talks kkodiihpgodmdankclfibbiphjkfdenh 1.16.2 TRUE 40,000 12/25/24 12/31/24
Uvoice oaikpkmjciadfpddlpjjdapglcihgdle 1.0.12 TRUE 40,000 12/26/24 12/31/24
Internxt VPN dpggmcodlahmljkhlmpgpdcffdaoccni 1.1.1 1.2.0 TRUE 10,000 12/25/24 12/29/24
Bookmark Favicon Changer acmfnomgphggonodopogfbmkneepfgnh 4.00 TRUE 40,000 12/25/24 12/31/24
Castorus mnhffkhmpnefgklngfmlndmkimimbphc 4.40 4.41 TRUE 50,000 12/26/24 12/27/24
Wayin AI cedgndijpacnfbdggppddacngjfdkaca 0.0.11 TRUE 40,000 12/19/24 12/31/24
Search Copilot AI Assistant for Chrome bbdnohkpnbkdkmnkddobeafboooinpla 1.0.1 TRUE 20,000 7/17/24 12/31/24
VidHelper - Video Downloader egmennebgadmncfjafcemlecimkepcle 2.2.7 TRUE 20,000 12/26/24 12/31/24
AI Assistant - ChatGPT and Gemini for Chrome bibjgkidgpfbblifamdlkdlhgihmfohh 0.1.3 FALSE 4,000 5/31/24 10/25/24
TinaMind - The GPT-4o-powered AI Assistant! befflofjcniongenjmbkgkoljhgliihe 2.13.0 2.14.0 TRUE 40,000 12/15/24 12/20/24
Bard AI chat pkgciiiancapdlpcbppfkmeaieppikkk 1.3.7 FALSE 100,000 9/5/24 10/22/24
Reader Mode llimhhconnjiflfimocjggfjdlmlhblm 1.5.7 FALSE 300,000 12/18/24 12/19/24
Primus (prev. PADO) oeiomhmbaapihbilkfkhmlajkeegnjhe 3.18.0 3.20.0 TRUE 40,000 12/18/24 12/25/24
Cyberhaven security extension V3 pajkjnmeojmbapicmbpliphjmcekeaac 24.10.4 24.10.5 TRUE 400,000 12/24/24 12/26/24
GraphQL Network Inspector ndlbedplllcgconngcnfmkadhokfaaln 2.22.6 2.22.7 TRUE 80,000 12/29/24 12/30/24
GPT 4 Summary with OpenAI epdjhgbipjpbbhoccdeipghoihibnfja 1.4 FALSE 10,000 5/31/24 9/29/24
Vidnoz Flex - Video recorder & Video share cplhlgabfijoiabgkigdafklbhhdkahj 1.0.161 FALSE 6,000 12/25/24 12/29/24
YesCaptcha assistant jiofmdifioeejeilfkpegipdjiopiekl 1.1.61 TRUE 200,000 12/29/24 12/31/24
Proxy SwitchyOmega (V3) hihblcmlaaademjlakdpicchbjnnnkbo 3.0.2 TRUE 10,000 12/30/24 12/31/24

But wait, there’s more

One of the compromised extensions is called Reader Mode. Further analysis showed it had been compromised not just in the campaign targeting the other 19 extensions but in a separate campaign that started no later than April 2023. Tuckner said the source of the compromise appears to be a code library developers can use to monetize their extensions. The code library collects details about each web visit a browser makes. In exchange for incorporating the library into the extensions, developers receive a commission from the library creator.

Tuckner said that Reader Mode is one of 13 Chrome extensions known to have used the library to collect potentially sensitive data. Collectively, these extensions had 1.14 million installations. The full list is:

Name ID Version Patch Available Users Start End
Reader Mode llimhhconnjiflfimocjggfjdlmlhblm 1.5.7 FALSE 300,000 12/18/24 12/19/24
Tackker - online keylogger tool ekpkdmohpdnebfedjjfklhpefgpgaaji 1.3 1.4 TRUE 10,000 10/6/23 8/13/24
AI Shop Buddy epikoohpebngmakjinphfiagogjcnddm 2.7.3 TRUE 4,000 4/30/24
Sort by Oldest miglaibdlgminlepgeifekifakochlka 1.4.5 TRUE 2,000 1/11/24
Rewards Search Automator eanofdhdfbcalhflpbdipkjjkoimeeod 1.4.9 TRUE 100,000 5/4/24
Earny - Up to 20% Cash Back ogbhbgkiojdollpjbhbamafmedkeockb 1.8.1 TRUE 100,00 4/5/23
ChatGPT Assistant - Smart Search bgejafhieobnfpjlpcjjggoboebonfcg 1.1.1 TRUE 189 2/12/24
Keyboard History Recorder igbodamhgjohafcenbcljfegbipdfjpk 2.3 TRUE 5,000 7/29/24
Email Hunter mbindhfolmpijhodmgkloeeppmkhpmhc 1.44 TRUE 100,000 9/17/24
Visual Effects for Google Meet hodiladlefdpcbemnbbcpclbmknkiaem 3.1.3 3.2.4 TRUE 900,000 6/13/23 1/10/24
ChatGPT App lbneaaedflankmgmfbmaplggbmjjmbae 1.3.8 TRUE 7,000 9/3/24
Web Mirror eaijffijbobmnonfhilihbejadplhddo 2.4 TRUE 4,000 10/13/23
Hi AI hmiaoahjllhfgebflooeeefeiafpkfde 1.0.0 TRUE 229 7/29/24

As Tuckner indicated, browser extensions have long remained a weak link in the security chain. In 2019, for example, extensions for both Chrome and Firefox were caught stealing sensitive data from 4 million devices. Many of the infected devices ran inside the networks of dozens of companies, including Tesla, Blue Origin, FireEye, Symantec, TMobile, and Reddit. In many cases, curbing the threat of malicious extensions is easy since so many extensions provide no useful benefit.

In the case of other abused extensions, such as the one used by Cyberhaven customers, it's not as easy to address the threat. After all, the extension provides a service that many organizations find valuable. Tuckner said one potential part of the solution is for organizations to compile a browser asset management list that allows only selected extensions to run and blocks all others. Even then, Cyberhaven customers would have installed the malicious extension version unless the asset management list specifies a specific version to trust and to distrust all others.

Anyone who ran one of these compromised extensions should carefully consider changing passwords and other authentication credentials. The Secure Annex post provides additional indicators of compromise, as do posts here, here, here, and here.

Photo of Dan Goodin
Dan Goodin Senior Security Editor
Dan Goodin is Senior Security Editor at Ars Technica, where he oversees coverage of malware, computer espionage, botnets, hardware hacking, encryption, and passwords. In his spare time, he enjoys gardening, cooking, and following the independent music scene. Dan is based in San Francisco. Follow him at here on Mastodon and here on Bluesky. Contact him on Signal at DanArs.82.
143 Comments
Staff Picks
emag
There are some weird comments here about using Brave and Firefox, as if their extensions are not also similarly vulnerable (in fact, Brave uses Chrome extensions; even Opera supports Chrome extensions through another Opera extension). At best you're arguing for security through obscurity, like the (pre-OS X) Mac fans in the 90s did when Windows viruses were in the news.

Ideally, you shouldn't be using any extensions at all or at least making sure those that you do use have very limited permissions (e.g., Manifest V3 adblockers).
E
There are some weird comments here about using Brave and Firefox, as if their extensions are not also similarly vulnerable (in fact, Brave uses Chrome extensions; even Opera supports Chrome extensions through another Opera extension). At best you're arguing for security through obscurity, like the (pre-OS X) Mac fans in the 90s did when Windows viruses were in the news.

Ideally, you shouldn't be using any extensions at all or at least making sure those that you do use have very limited permissions (e.g., Manifest V3 adblockers).
I agree that pretending you're safe because you don't use Chrome is stupid, but "you shouldn't be using any extensions at all" is misguided. Extensions can absolutely increase your security. A password manager means you can use more secure passwords. Extensions can also be used to block the shadier aspects of browsing that have been accepted as just the cost of doing business on the internet.
f
Good lord. A senior dev in an apparently well-respected security company specialising in security software fell for a phishing email?

What hope do the rest of us have? Especially our family, friends, and work colleagues?
OAuth phishing is extra nasty because, while most services have taken at least marginal steps toward making odd sign-ins visible(and even the ones that don't do it for security reasons sometimes make sign-in events and actions taken using the standard user interface relatively noisy), the fact that you can even delegate certain functions tends to be unknown entirely by standard users; and which ones you can delegate and which ones you in fact have delegated is usually really cryptic and poorly exposed(with occasional fun bugs where it's possible to hide grants from whatever dubiously adequate tool is supposed to display them).

I understand that what they were trying to do is hard; and remember that the "just give us your username and password and we'll totally only hijack your account for our one stated purpose, pinky swear" delegation model was abject trash; but you could be forgiven for thinking that OAuth grants were designed as an attacker persistence mechanism; given how well they do that job.

At work we lock it down: only specific administrative accounts can even authorize OAuth grants; both because phishing is way too easy and common and because the spirit of awful mobile OS permissions is alive and well and 'legitimate' applications demanding alarmingly broad permissions are everywhere; but I can only conclude that users in general are screwed; and it would probably be deeply alarming to know how many are merrily sailing along with "innocuous utility" granted "plunder everything" permissions in the background.